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QUESTION PRESENTED 
The qualified immunity defense insulates federal 
and state officials from monetary damages unless 
they have violated clearly established rights.  To 
determine whether a right is “clearly established,” 
courts compare the facts at issue to the legal analysis 
of an official’s actions in factually similar scenarios.  
Because the Court has not articulated a single 
approach, the circuits employ conflicting standards 
over the degree of similarity required and 
substantially disagree over which sources of 
authority are used to show that the law is clearly 
established.  
The question presented is:  
Whether a right is clearly established in a case 
with a novel fact pattern when a consensus of several 
circuits’ precedents have recognized the right at a 
level of specificity such that any further distinction 
lacks legal significance.  
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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
Petitioner is Richard Ortega, who was the 
plaintiff and appellant below.  
Respondents, who were defendants in the district 
court and appellees in the court of appeals are Mark 
Bolton, William Skaggs, Lori Eppler, 
Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government 
(collectively “Metro Respondents”), and John T. 
Cloyd, an Immigrations & Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) agent.  
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IN THE 
Supreme Court of the United States 
_________ 
 
No. 13-___ 
_________ 
RICHARD ORTEGA, 
 
Petitioner, 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION & 
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ET AL., 
 
Respondents. 
_________ 
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the  
United States Court of Appeals  
for the Sixth Circuit 
_________ 
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
_________ 
Petitioner Richard Ortega respectfully petitions 
this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the 
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit in this case. 
OPINIONS BELOW 
The opinion of the Sixth Circuit is reported at 
737 F.3d 435 and reproduced at page 1a of the 
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appendix to this petition (“App.”).  The unpublished 
order of the District Court is reproduced at App. 18a.  
JURISDICTION 
The judgment of the Sixth Circuit was entered on 
December 10, 2013.  App. 1a.  This Court has 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).  
STATUTORY & REGULATORY  
PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
The text of relevant statutes and regulations are 
set forth in the appendix to this petition.  App. 29a. 
INTRODUCTION 
This case presents a question of extreme 
importance on the nature of proof required to 
establish that a right is clearly established.  Nearly 
thirty years ago, this Court recognized that the 
“clearly established” inquiry turns on how 
specifically a court articulates the rule at issue.  
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).  
The Court expressed concern that the qualified 
immunity doctrine would become meaningless if 
rights were defined at improper levels of generality. 
Id.  
Fifteen years after Anderson, the Court provided 
contradictory guidance as to how lower courts should 
conduct the clearly established inquiry.  In Hope v. 
Pelzer, the Court held that a right could be generally 
defined, contrary to the Court’s holding in Anderson 
that a right must be specifically defined. 536 U.S. 
730, 741 (2002) (citing United States v. Lanier, 520 
U.S. 259 (1997)).  More recently, the Court has 
suggested that the appropriate level of specificity 
falls somewhere between the two cases, but the 
Court has not provided explicit guidance.  See 
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Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011); 
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198-99 (2004) (per 
curiam). This doctrinal uncertainty has plagued 
courts’ ability to consistently render the clearly 
established analysis, among and within the circuits.  
As the Fifth Circuit recently recognized, this Court’s 
“admonition in al–Kidd that [lower courts] should 
not define clearly established law at a high level of 
generality sits in tension with its earlier statement 
in Hope v. Pelzer that general statements of the law 
are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear 
warning, at least in a certain category of obvious 
cases.”  Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 373 (5th 
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 As a result of this tension, the circuits are 
inexorably divided among myriad regimes on the 
precedential weight of prior opinions based on their 
nature, type, and circuit of origin.  This leads to 
substantial disuniformity; a right may be considered 
clearly established in one circuit but not another 
despite the exact same precedential profile.  For 
instance, whereas the facts of this case would very 
likely lead to finding the officers in this case were not 
entitled to qualified immunity under the Third, 
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits’ standards, the 
Second, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits would likely 
disagree. 
The test adopted by the panel majority here, 
according to Judge Keith’s dissent, “allows an officer 
to blatantly violate the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights of an American 
citizen—so long as it was done in a manner that 
neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has 
directly opined on before—with impunity.”  App. 16a. 
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(Keith, J., dissenting).  The Sixth Circuit committed 
a fundamental error, the immediate effect of which 
distorts this Court’s holdings and contravenes the 
decisions of other circuits.  Certiorari is warranted 
for two main reasons. 
First, the Sixth Circuit deepened a conflict 
among the circuits, and incorrectly applied the 
analysis regarding whether a right is clearly 
established.  The panel majority adopted a far-too 
limited definition of the term “clearly established,” 
defying the holdings of this Court and other circuits.  
The panel majority contravened this Court’s 
precedent when determining whether unlawfulness 
was apparent by failing to evaluate whether the 
factual circumstances of this case were contextually 
similar to prior cases.  This case highlights the 
myriad differences among the circuits in how they 
determine whether a right is clearly established.  
They differ on what types of authorities may be used 
to prove a right is clearly established, and they differ 
on the level of factual similarity required between 
cases to prove a right is clearly established.  Only 
this Court’s guidance can remedy these inconsistent 
regimes. 
Second, this case presents an issue of extreme 
importance.  Qualified immunity is asserted in 
nearly every case involving a claim against a 
government official in his or her individual capacity 
for damages.  Properly applying this standard is of 
exceptional importance because the approach that a 
court takes in articulating and assessing whether the 
law is clearly established is often outcome-
determinative.  Absent this Court’s direct guidance, 
lower courts will continue to disparately assess 
qualified immunity, generating avoidable 
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uncertainty.  Review is also warranted because 
circuit and district courts routinely struggle with 
applying the doctrine.  Non-uniform qualified 
immunity standards lead to unjust results, and 
inconsistent standards hamper certainty and 
predictability for litigants, government officials, and 
the courts.   
For these reasons and those that follow, the 
Court should grant the petition and reverse the 
judgment below.  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Factual Background.  A Kentucky court sentenced 
Petitioner Richard Ortega, a third generation United 
States citizen, to fourteen days of home confinement 
after his conviction for driving under the influence.  
App. 3a.  Individuals participating in Kentucky’s 
home confinement program are required to wear an 
electronic monitoring device at all times, and must 
satisfy certain agreed upon conditions to remain in 
the program.  App. 3; see also App. 35a.  Under his 
term of home confinement, Ortega was allowed to go 
to work, to medical appointments, and to church if he 
received prior approval.  App. 3a.  It is undisputed 
that, at all times, Ortega complied with the 
requirements of the home confinement program and 
the home confinement agreement he had signed.  
While Ortega was under home confinement, ICE 
agent John Cloyd issued an immigration detainer 
naming Ortega as a suspected illegal alien.  App. 3a.  
ICE purportedly served the detainer because Ortega 
had a similar name and birthdate to an illegal alien 
who had previously been deported.  App. 3a. 
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After receiving the detainer, the local corrections 
department removed Ortega from home confinement 
and took him to jail.  App. 3a-4a.  When the 
authorities arrived to remove Ortega, they refused to 
allow him to show them any forms of identification or 
proof of his United States citizenship.  They refused 
to allow him to produce his driver’s license or Social 
Security card.  App. 4a; see also App. 13a.  The 
corrections department then took Ortega to jail, 
affording him no process whatsoever.  See App. 4a; 
13a.  Ortega remained there for four days until the 
corrections officials discovered that Ortega was, as 
he claimed, a United States citizen.  App. 3a. 
Proceedings Below.  Ortega sued Cloyd, the 
Louisville Department of Corrections, and the 
officers who jailed him, claiming that removal from 
home confinement to institutional confinement 
without any warrant or process violated the Fourth, 
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.  App. 4.  He 
brought a Bivens claim against ICE agent Cloyd for 
violating his right to be free from unreasonable 
seizures and his right to due process, based on 
Cloyd’s issuance of an unlawful ICE detainer.  App. 
4.  He also brought § 1983 claims against the local 
corrections officials for violating his right to be free 
from unreasonable seizure and his right to due 
process of law, based on removing him from home 
confinement and taking him to jail.  App. 4. 
The district court granted the defendants’ motion 
to dismiss based on qualified immunity.  App. 19a.  
Ortega appealed the decision, arguing there is a 
liberty interest in remaining in non-institutional 
confinement and that some process is required to be 
removed from non-institutional confinement and 
placed in jail or prison.  App. 4a-5a.  Ortega cited a 
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case from the Seventh Circuit which held, on very 
similar facts, that there is a liberty interest in home 
confinement once it has been ordered.  Br. of 
Appellant at 16, Ortega v. United States Immigration 
& Customs Enforcement, et al., (No. 12-6608).  
Additionally, he cited cases from the First, Second, 
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits that held there is a 
liberty interest in remaining in other non-
institutional forms of confinement.  Id. at 15-16.  He 
argued these precedents were based on this Court’s 
precedents that stated there is a fundamental 
difference between being confined at home and being 
confined to an institution.  Id. at 18-19.  
The Sixth Circuit agreed there is a liberty 
interest in remaining in home confinement once 
ordered.  App. 6a-8a.  It held the change between 
home confinement and institutional confinement was 
a “sufficiently severe change in conditions to 
implicate due process.”  App. 7a.  
The panel majority held, though, that this right 
was not clearly established.  App. 8a-10a.  The court 
ruled that the myriad precedents it relied on to 
recognize the right were not sufficient to clearly 
establish the right.  App. 10a.  The court declined to 
give weight to analogous cases with similar facts, 
saying that they were not similar enough to establish 
the right.  See App. 9a-10a.  
 Judge Keith dissented, finding Ortega’s liberty 
interest in home confinement clearly established.  
App. 10.  Judge Keith found Ortega’s claims to be 
based on “core constitutional principles.”  App. 14a.  
He also considered the Supreme Court precedent and 
analogous cases to be relevant and decisive.  App. 
15a.  He wrote that “[a]t a minimum, those decisions 
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firmly establish that an individual serving a 
sentence outside of prison is entitled to some 
minimum amount of process before being arrested 
and taken to jail.”  App. 15a.  
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 
I. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT DEEPENED A CON-
FLICT AMONG THE CIRCUITS REGAR-
DING HOW TO PROVE THAT A RIGHT IS 
CLEARLY ESTABLISHED  
Qualified immunity affords government officials 
immunity from civil damages unless (1) “the official 
violated a statutory or constitutional right” and 
(2) the right “was clearly established at the time of 
the challenged conduct.”  Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. 
Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012). This petition focuses solely on 
the second inquiry.  This Court explained that “the 
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a 
reasonable official would understand that what he is 
doing violates that right.”  Anderson, 483 U.S. at 
640.  The circuits are divided on how to determine 
the clarity of a right’s contours in at least two ways.
First, they are divided on what sources of 
authority clearly establish a right.  This Court has 
not expressly stated what authority makes a right 
clearly established, although it has suggested 
support for different standards.  Compare al-Kidd, 
131 S. Ct. at 2083-84 (supporting a narrow 
standard), with Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646 
(supporting a broad standard by recognizing that 
qualified immunity protects officials from personal 
liability “as long as their actions are reasonable in 
the light of current American law”).
Second, when looking to the appropriate 
authority, a court must determine whether 
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sufficiently comparable situations exist because, “in 
light of pre-existing law[,] the unlawfulness [of the 
government action] must be apparent.”  Anderson, 
483 U.S. at 640.  This Court later clarified, however, 
that “officials can still be on notice that their conduct 
violates clearly established law even in novel factual 
circumstances.”  Hope, 536 U.S. at 741.  In other 
words, courts must look beyond the exact factual 
circumstances of the previously recognized right.  See 
id.  The circuits’ approaches to novel fact patterns 
differ measurably. 
A. The Circuits Employ Significantly 
Different Standards Regarding What 
Sources of Authority Clearly 
Establish A Right 
1. Broad Standards 
The Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits 
employ the broadest standards. 
The Ninth Circuit first looks to Supreme Court 
and Ninth Circuit precedent.  Boyd v. Benton Cnty., 
374 F.3d 773, 781 (9th Cir. 2004).  If no binding 
precedent exists, the Ninth Circuit considers 
available “decisional law” from sister circuits, federal 
district courts, and state courts.  Drummond v. City 
of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1061 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(quoting Malik v. Brown, 71 F.3d 724, 727 (9th Cir. 
1995)).  If no binding or on-point case law exists, the 
court will determine the likelihood of the Supreme 
Court or the Ninth Circuit reaching the same result 
by comparing the legal analysis of sister circuits with 
the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in related, but factually 
distinct scenarios.  Boyd, 374 F.3d at 781 (citing  
Capoeman v. Reed, 754 F.2d 1512, 1514-15 (1985)).  
The Ninth Circuit stated that it is not necessary “to 
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find closely analogous case law to show that a right 
is clearly established.”  Bryan v. McPherson, 630 
F.3d 805, 833 (9th Cir. 2010).  Finally, the court 
allows the use of unpublished dispositions to 
establish a right.  McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536, 
1555 n.28 (9th Cir. 1996).
The Seventh Circuit employs a standard that is 
equally broad.  Like the Ninth Circuit, the Seventh 
Circuit first looks to see whether the Supreme Court 
or the Seventh Circuit has issued “controlling 
precedent.”  Estate of Escobedo v. Bender, 600 F.3d 
770, 781 (7th Cir. 2010).  If such precedent cannot be 
found, the Seventh Circuit will “broaden [its] survey 
to include all relevant case law in order to determine 
whether there was such a clear trend in the case law 
that [the Seventh Circuit] can say with fair 
assurance that the recognition of the right by a 
controlling precedent was merely a question of time.”  
Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Jacobs v. City of Chi., 215 F.3d 
758, 766 (7th Cir. 2000). 
The Eighth Circuit has explicitly embraced the 
“broad view of the concept of clearly established law.” 
Vaughn v. Ruoff, 253 F.3d 1124, 1129 (8th Cir. 2001). 
Absent binding Supreme Court or Eighth Circuit 
precedent, the Eighth Circuit “look[s] to all available 
decisional law, including decisions from other courts, 
federal and state.”  Id.  
The Third Circuit is somewhat inconsistent.  Its 
opinions show a broad use of available precedent to 
determine whether a right is clearly established.  
See, e.g., Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 
211 n.4 (3d Cir. 2001) (“If the unlawfulness of the 
defendant’s conduct would have been apparent to a 
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reasonable official based on the current state of the 
law, it is not necessary that there be binding 
precedent from this circuit so advising.”); Rivas v. 
City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181, 198-200 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(taking into account a Third Circuit case and two 
Seventh Circuit cases in declaring that the law was 
clearly established).  Federal district court opinions 
can also help clearly establish a right in the Third 
Circuit.  Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d 186, 193 n.7 
(3d Cir. 2006). 
2. Narrow Standards 
The Second, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits 
implement a narrow standard for determining 
clearly established law. 
The Eleventh Circuit articulated that “only 
binding precedent can clearly establish a right for 
qualified immunity purposes.”  Gilmore v. Hodges, 
738 F.3d 266, 279 (11th Cir. 2013).  Thus, a right can 
only be clearly established by the Supreme Court, 
the Eleventh Circuit, or the highest court of the 
relevant state.  See id. 
The Fourth Circuit similarly confines the 
analysis of precedent to the law of the relevant 
jurisdiction.  Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 
107, 124 (4th Cir. 2013); Edwards v. City of 
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 251 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(“[C]ourts in this circuit [ordinarily] need not look 
beyond the decisions of the Supreme Court, this 
court of appeals, and the highest court of the state in 
which the case arose.”) (alteration in original and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  The Second 
Circuit also uses a narrow standard but frames the 
analysis differently.  The Second Circuit determines 
whether the Supreme Court or the Second Circuit 
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“had affirmed the existence of the right.”  Townes v. 
City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 144 (2d Cir. 1999).  
In the absence of binding precedent, the Second 
Circuit determines whether the state of the law was 
sufficient to put a reasonable government official 
within the Second Circuit on notice of the 
constitutional right.  See Gonzalez v. City of 
Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir. 2013); see 
also Young v. Cnty. of Fulton, 160 F.3d 899, 903 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (“The question is not what a lawyer would 
learn or intuit from researching case law, but what a 
reasonable person in a defendant’s position should 
know about the constitutionality of the conduct.”).  
Additionally, federal district court opinions cannot 
clearly establish a right.  Hawkins v. Steingut, 829 
F.2d 317, 321 (2d Cir. 1987).  
Unsurprisingly, the Second, Fourth, and 
Eleventh Circuits do not allow unpublished opinions 
to contribute to their determinations.  See, e.g., 
Cerrone v. Brown, 246 F.3d 194, 202 (2d Cir. 2001); 
Hogan v. Carter, 85 F.3d 1113, 1118 (4th Cir. 1996); 
Gilmore, 738 F.3d at 279. 
3. Semi-Narrow Standards 
The First, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits use 
standards between broad and narrow. 
For a right to be clearly established in the Tenth 
Circuit, “there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth 
Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established 
weight of authority from other courts must have 
found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.”  
Schwartz v. Booker, 702 F.3d 573, 587-88 (10th Cir. 
2012) (emphasis added) (quoting Walker v. City of 
Orem, 451 F.3d 1139, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006)).   
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The Fifth Circuit uses a similar standard, 
although it narrows the scope of on-point authority. 
A right is clearly established if the Fifth Circuit can 
“point to a controlling authority—or a robust 
consensus of persuasive authority—that defines the 
contours of the right in question with a high degree 
of particularity.”  Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 
371-72 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and 
footnote omitted). 
The D.C. Circuit requires its own binding 
precedent to clearly establish a right.  Youngbey v. 
March, 676 F.3d 1114, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2012).  In the 
absence of controlling precedent, the D.C. Circuit 
will consider whether persuasive authority has come 
to a consensus on the matter.  Id.  
Although less explicit about the terms of its 
analysis, the First Circuit also uses a semi-narrow 
standard.  The First Circuit recognizes a right as 
clearly established if the Supreme Court or First 
Circuit has issued on-point precedent, or if a “clear 
consensus” has developed among the other circuits 
regarding the right.  See Walden v. City of 
Providence, 596 F.3d 38, 53-54 (1st Cir. 2010); 
Whitfield v. Melendez-Rivera, 431 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 
2005). 
4. The Panel Applied a Narrow 
Standard in This Case 
The Sixth Circuit panel majority here applied an 
unclear narrow standard.  In his briefs, Ortega 
established that the First, Second, Seventh, Eighth, 
and Tenth Circuits “recognized that being removed 
from custodial confinement outside the prison system 
and being placed in institutional confinement 
triggered a constitutionally protected liberty 
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interest,” which in turn required some amount of 
process.  Br. of Appellant at 16, Ortega v. United 
States Immigration & Customs Enforcement, et al., 
(No. 12-6608); see also App. at 15a (Keith, J., 
dissenting).  Yet the panel majority only considered 
the law of two other circuits rather than the full 
breadth of circuits Ortega put before the court.  
Underscoring the point, the panel majority stated 
that “Ortega points to three cases” and then 
discussed only those cases, which were from two 
other circuits and ignored the numerous other cases 
in additional circuits that were also on point.  App. at 
9a-10a (majority opinion).  The panel majority did 
not state on what standard it excluded the other 
cited authority from consideration. 
B. The Circuits Employ Significantly 
Different Standards on the Needed 
Level of Factual Similarity to 
Establish Apparent Unlawfulness 
The circuits also articulate different analytical 
frameworks for determining the apparent unlawful-
ness of official conduct in novel factual circum-
stances.  
The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have held that 
the law can be clearly established in novel factual 
circumstances, even without a body of specific case 
law.  The Eleventh Circuit allows broad principles to 
control novel factual situations.  Keating v. City of 
Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 766 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding 
that in novel cases a “broader, clearly established 
principal” may control or in obvious cases that prior 
case law may be unnecessary).  The Fourth Circuit 
likewise has held that case law need not address the 
right in a “specific context before such right may be 
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held ‘clearly established.’”  Meyers v. Balt. Cnty., 713 
F.3d 723, 734 (4th Cir. 2013).  
The First, Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits 
instead focus on a narrower notice-based analysis.  
They evaluate the reasonableness of a government 
official’s ability to recognize the unconstitutionality 
of the actions at issue.  Winslow v. Smith, 696 F.3d 
716, 738 (8th Cir. 2012); Martinez-Rodriguez v. 
Guevara, 597 F.3d 414, 419 (1st Cir. 2010); Estate of 
Escobedo v. Bender, 600 F.3d 770, 781 (7th Cir. 
2010); Pena v. DePrisco, 432 F.3d 98, 114-15 (2d Cir. 
2005).  Under these circuits’ analyses the law can be 
clearly established even when there are notable 
factual distinctions, if prior decisions give officials 
reasonable warning of the unconstitutionality of 
their actions.  Estate of Escobedo, 600 F.3d at 781.  
The Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits place more 
emphasis on the specific facts of the case and the 
ability of the official to apply established law.  The 
Third Circuit only considers “broad principles” in 
“extraordinary cases,” and assesses “whether the 
official should have related this established law to 
the instant circumstance.”  Schneyder v. Smith, 653 
F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Burns v. Pa. 
Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 177 (3d Cir. 2011)).  The 
Tenth Circuit adopts a similar approach.  See Gomes 
v. Wood, 451 F.3d 1122, 1134 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(“[G]overnment officials [should] make ‘reasonable 
applications of the prevailing law to their own 
circumstances.” (quoting Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 
905, 923 (10th Cir. 2001)).  The Fifth Circuit, 
however, requires a more fact-intensive analysis to 
establish applicable precedent.  Kinney v. Weaver, 
367 F.3d 337, 387-88 (5th Cir. 2004).  
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C. This Case Presents an Ideal Vehicle 
for Clarifying the Proper Approach to 
Determine Whether a Right Is Clearly 
Established 
This case stands at the intersection of what law 
should be considered to determine whether a right is 
clearly established both as it relates to the source of 
the law and as it relates to the level of generality at 
which the right is stated.  There is tension between 
the Court’s analyses in Hope, which declared “that 
there need not be a case on point to overcome 
qualified immunity,” and Brosseau, which denied 
“qualified immunity based on the lack of a case on 
point.”  Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction     
§ 8.6, at 555 (5th ed. 2007); see Hope, 536 U.S. 730; 
Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198-99.  With no clear 
guidance from this Court, the circuits have created 
widely divergent standards.   
The circuits’ different standards vary so widely 
that results are contrary even with similar facts.  For 
example, had Ortega’s case arisen in the Ninth 
Circuit (broad standard) rather than the Sixth 
Circuit (semi-narrow standard), the Ninth Circuit 
would likely have considered the similar cases in the 
First, Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits 
as clearly establishing the constitutional right.  This 
result stands in direct opposition to the Sixth 
Circuit’s determination.  
Similarly, the very narrow view of the right at 
issue that the majority took—highlighted by Judge 
Keith’s dissent—stands in contrast with several 
circuits and this Court.  The Court has repeatedly 
explained that contextually similar factual 
situations—not only “the very act in question”—can 
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clearly establish a right.  Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640; 
see also Safford Unified School Dist. No. 1 v. 
Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377-78 (2009); Hope, 536 U.S. 
at 741; Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 604 (1999).  
Circuits have come to differing conclusions on what 
this means. 
In this case, the panel majority demanded nearly 
identical facts by either not considering cases 
involving contextually similar facts, or dismissing 
such cases as insufficient.  This was error.  Ortega 
pointed to multiple circuit holdings to clearly 
establish his liberty interest in non-institutional 
confinement.  The Tenth Circuit found a liberty 
interest in a pre-parole program, saying that there 
was a “fundamental change in the kind of 
confinement.”  Harper v. Young, 64 F.3d 563, 566 
(10th Cir. 1995).  Additionally, the Second and 
Eighth Circuits recognized a liberty interest in a 
prison work release program that triggered due 
process rights.  Kim v. Hurston, 182 F.3d 113, 118-20 
(2d Cir. 1999); Edwards v. Lockhart, 908 F.2d 299, 
301-02 (8th Cir. 1990).  The First Circuit, in a case 
involving a home incarceration program, held that 
“the Due Process Clause is particularly protective of 
individuals participating in non-institutional forms 
of confinement.”  Gonzales-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 
F.3d 864, 890 (1st Cir. 2010).  Finally, on nearly 
identical facts, the Seventh Circuit held that being 
removed from home confinement and taken to jail is 
a “sufficient reduction” in liberty to be subject to 
some amount of due process.  Paige v. Hudson, 341 
F.3d 642, 643 (7th Cir. 2003). 
The panel majority defined the issue as whether 
there was a liberty interest in being left in home 
confinement rather than being taken to jail.  App. 4a.  
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Under the standards espoused by some circuits—
such as the Fourth and the Eleventh—the issue 
would have been more properly defined as whether it 
was clearly established that there is a liberty 
interest in remaining outside the walls of 
institutional confinement. 
Judge Keith, dissenting, considered analogous 
precedent from other circuits sufficient to proclaim 
the law clearly established.  By taking into account a 
broader array of precedent, Judge Keith reached the 
opposite conclusion from the panel majority.  (Keith, 
J., dissenting).  He highlighted the majority’s error 
when he explained that the majority’s holding 
“allows an officer to blatantly violate the Fourth, 
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights of an 
American citizen—so long as it was done in a 
manner that neither [the Sixth Circuit] nor the 
Supreme Court has directly opined on before—with 
impunity.”  App. 16a. (Keith, J., dissenting). 
This case highlights the inconsistent application 
of qualified immunity’s “clearly established” analysis 
between the circuits.  Depending upon what judicial 
authority a court will consult, and whether a court 
will consider contextually similar—but not 
identical—factual situations, courts arrive at utterly 
opposed conclusions.  In this case, the clear 
establishment of the right at issue is completely 
dependent upon the analysis used.  This case is thus 
a particularly effective vehicle for clarifying the 
standard for determining when a right is already 
clearly established. 
19 
 
II. THIS CASE PRESENTS A QUESTION OF 
EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE 
The extraordinary importance of qualified 
immunity to constitutional tort litigation is 
undeniable.  A damages remedy against overzealous 
government officials is, in many cases, the only 
realistic way citizens can safeguard their 
constitutional guarantees.  See Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (“For people in Bivens’ 
shoes it is damages or nothing.”).  Weighing against 
that interest is the court-derived qualified immunity 
doctrine, which admirably reduces frivolous lawsuits 
but also reduces the deterrent effect of the damages 
remedy on official decision making.  See Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).  Striking the 
proper equilibrium between vindicating individual 
rights and preventing interference with effective 
governance is an essential judicial function, and one 
that this Court has endeavored to provide for the 
lower courts with sufficient clarity on an ongoing 
basis.  
But doctrinal uncertainty has plagued courts’ 
ability to consistently render the analysis, among 
and within the circuits.  Nearly thirty years ago, this 
Court recognized that the clearly established inquiry 
will turn on how specifically a court articulates the 
rule at issue.  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 
639 (1987) (“The operation of this standard . . . 
depends substantially upon the level of generality at 
which the relevant legal rule is to be identified.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  Fifteen years 
after Anderson, in Hope v. Pelzer, this Court 
provided contradictory guidance to lower courts 
about how they should conduct the clearly 
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established inquiry.  546 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) 
(holding that a right could be generally defined, 
contrary to Anderson’s holding that a right must be 
specifically defined).  More recently, this Court has 
suggested that the appropriate level of specificity 
falls somewhere between the two cases but has not 
provided explicit guidance.  Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 
S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 
U.S. 194, 198-99 (2004) (per curiam); see also Morgan 
v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 373 (5th Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (recognizing al-Kidd sits in tension with Hope 
v. Pelzer). 
Consequently, conspicuous differences in how 
circuit courts are defining and applying the term 
clearly established are distorting the operation of the 
qualified immunity doctrine as this Court intended.  
Absent this Court’s direct guidance, the qualified 
immunity doctrine will remain substantially 
disparate among the lower courts and continue 
generating avoidable uncertainty.   
1. Although the “clearly established” inquiry 
appears straightforward on its face, appellate and 
district courts routinely struggle when applying the 
doctrine.  See, e.g., Thomson v. Salt Lake Cnty., 584 
F.3d 1304, 1327 & n.1 (10th Cir. 2009) (Holmes, J., 
concurring) (“Courts and litigants alike often have 
difficulty analyzing whether summary judgment on 
the basis of qualified immunity is appropriate.”); see 
also Michael M. Rosen, A Qualified Defense: In 
Support of the Doctrine of Qualified Immunity in 
Excessive Force Cases, With Some Suggestions for Its 
Improvement, 35 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 139, 173 
(2005) (“[T]his seemingly simple qualified immunity 
standard actually contains great complexity. . . . 
[T]he definition of clear establishment is as murky as 
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it is crucial.”).  Importantly, the approach that a 
court takes in articulating and assessing whether the 
law is clearly established is often outcome-
determinative.  See Amelia A. Friedman, Qualified 
Immunity in the Fifth Circuit: Identifying the 
“Obvious” Hole in Clearly Established Law, 90 TEX. 
L. REV. 1283, 1286 (2012) (explaining that broadly 
defined rights tend to defeat immunity claims 
whereas specifically defined rights shield more 
government defendants with immunity).  
In light of the “clearly established” inquiry’s 
often dispositive nature, the circuits have cast rights 
with varying standards, producing persistent and 
pronounced instability.  John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s 
Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 
851, 852 (2010); see Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of 
Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the 
Role of Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U.L. 
REV. 1, 4-5 (1997) (“While the qualified immunity 
defense has long been recognized, its application and 
administration continue to perplex courts and 
provoke a substantial amount of scholarly 
commentary.”).  These perplexities have not subsided 
over time; indeed, the fractured state of the “clearly 
established” analysis has been a constant source of 
the doctrine’s shortcoming.  Compare, e.g., Casey v. 
City of Fed. Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 
2007) (“The difficult part of this inquiry is identifying 
the level of generality at which the constitutional 
right must be clearly established.”  (internal 
quotation marks omitted)), with Gooden v. Howard 
Cnty., 917 F.2d 1355, 1365 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority defines 
“clearly established” law at a level of generality so 
broad as to discard qualified immunity. . . . [T]he 
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cumulative effect of which is to leave the defense of 
qualified immunity in a rubbled state.”), opinion 
superseded on reh’g, 954 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1992). 
Doctrinal disuniformity conspicuously manifests 
itself in two important ways.  First, judges within 
the same circuit arrive at opposing conclusions as to 
whether the law has been clearly established at the 
proper level of specificity.1  Second, the circuits differ 
in their willingness to look to factually analogous 
cases in determining if the law has been clearly 
established.2  They also differ regarding whether 
                                            
1 See, e.g., Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1089 n.1 
(9th Cir. 2013) (“We disagree with the dissent’s concern that we 
are undertaking this constitutional inquiry at too high a level of 
generality.”); Henry v. Purnell, 619 F.3d 323, 342 (4th Cir. 
2010) (Gregory, J., dissenting) (criticizing the panel majority 
from improperly framing the clearly established inquiry), rev’d 
en banc, 652 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 2011); Green v. New Jersey State 
Police, 246 F. App’x 158, 164 (3d Cir. 2007) (Garth, J., 
dissenting) (“I believe that the majority has conceived of the 
right here at issue at too high [a] level of generality to be useful 
in a case that presents this entirely novel fact pattern.”  
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Perez v. Oakland Cnty., 466 F.3d 416, 436-37 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(Moore, J., dissenting) (“I do not believe that the grant of 
qualified immunity [] is justified in this case. . . . I do not agree 
with the characterization of the issue in this case.”); Medina v. 
Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1129 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The dissent 
therefore reads Crawford–El too broadly and fails to apply 
Supreme Court precedent emphasizing the unique nature of a 
qualified immunity defense.”). 
2 See, e.g., Panagoulakos v. Yazzie, No. 13-2003, 2013 WL 
6698134, at *5 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2013) (Holloway, J., 
dissenting) (“The majority’s holding that the officer is entitled 
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they will consider case law developed in other 
circuits.  See Friedman, supra, at 1289-90 (collecting 
cases and explaining “[t]he Second and Eleventh 
Circuits limit the analysis to case law from within 
each circuit.  The Eighth and Ninth Circuits are 
willing to consider all available decisional law.  The 
Fourth and Sixth Circuits only look to extra-circuit 
case law in limited circumstances and as such are 
practically as restrictive as the Eleventh Circuit. . . . 
[T]he Fifth Circuit’s approach more closely resembles 
the restrictive practice in the Fourth and Sixth 
Circuit[s]”). 
Simply put, federal circuits have developed 
different approaches to describing and assessing 
whether law is clearly established.  Id. at 1284.  
These variations have been the subject of significant 
academic commentary and debate, especially because 
definitional challenges in qualified immunity 
doctrine are one of the most philosophically and 
                                                                                          
to qualified immunity for her mistake of law is contrary to our 
precedents.”); Newman v. Guedry, 703 F.3d 757, 769 (5th Cir. 
2012) (Barskdale, J., dissenting) (“To hold [that the officers are 
not shielded by qualified immunity] is to turn a blind eye to the 
material facts at hand (which are not disputed) and the 
controlling law.”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 162 (2013); Scozzari v. 
Miedzianowski, 454 F. App’x 455, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(McKeague, J., dissenting) (“Not only does Owensby fail to 
provide the clearly established law here, no other case in this 
Circuit or the Supreme Court provides guidance on how an 
officer must proceed after he has already called for emergency 
medical services beyond the general admonition not to 
unreasonably delay access to medical treatment in the face of a 
serious need.”). 
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conceptually challenging tasks routinely faced by the 
federal judiciary.  Circuit Judge Charles R. Wilson, 
“Location, Location, Location”: Recent Developments 
in the Qualified Immunity Defense, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 445, 447 (2000).  Without further 
command from this Court, lower courts will continue 
to wrestle with recurring issues that muddle 
qualified immunity determinations in constitutional 
tort actions.  
2. Non-uniform qualified immunity standards 
also lead to unjust results and a sense of injustice.  
The resulting effect is that lower courts conduct their 
qualified immunity analysis in “an ad hoc manner, 
giving the entire process a rather arbitrary feel.”  
Michael S. Catlett, Clearly Not Established: 
Decisional Law and the Qualified Immunity 
Doctrine, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 1031, 1035-36 (2005).  
Though “[t]he resolution of immunity questions 
inherently requires a balance between the evils 
inevitable in any available alternative,” Harlow, 457 
U.S. at 813-14, blatant differences in the protections 
of constitutional rights should not be struck merely 
based on geography.  
Maintaining consistency across the country is 
critical to ensuring the doctrine operates properly.  
See, e.g., Casey v. City of Federal Heights, 509 F.3d 
1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2007) (“The difficult part of this 
inquiry is identifying the level of generality at which 
the constitutional right must be clearly 
established.”); Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d 
447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001) (“To ensure that qualified 
immunity serves its intended purpose, it is of 
paramount import, during step two, to define  
‘clearly established law’ at the proper level of 
generality.”).   
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In addition, the power of the “clearly established 
requirement” cannot be left unstated—government 
officials can violate a constitutional right and yet be 
immune from liability.  One commentator has found 
it “disturbing” and “somewhat bizarre” that some 
courts of appeals have contorted their application of 
the doctrine to the point that qualified immunity will 
apply unless the Supreme Court itself has held the 
precise, identical conduct at issue unlawful.  Karen 
M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: Further Developments 
in the Post-Pearson Era, 27 TOURO L. REV. 243, 253 
(2011).  More importantly, the sense of injustice 
manufactured by disparate application of 
constitutional principles is problematic.  This is an 
especially salient consideration in the context of suits 
that seek to remedy alleged constitutional violations.  
Moreover, establishing that the Constitution has 
been violated is itself a difficult task, and to further 
erect substantial barriers to vindicating constitu-
tional violations should not change depending on the 
happenstance location of where wrongdoing 
occurred.  See Alexander A. Reinert, Does Qualified 
Immunity Matter?, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 477, 479 
(2011).  Were that the case, plaintiffs (and 
defendants) would have perverse incentives to 
procure the most favorable substantive law through 
forum shopping.  This is a realistic strategic 
consideration when federal officials perform their 
own duties or work with other officials involved 
across multiple circuits, or when there are joint 
claims against state and federal officials operating in 
different locales.  In other contexts, this Court has 
denounced the creation of opportunities for forum 
shopping.  See Atl. Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. 
Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Tex., 134 S. Ct. 568, 581-82 
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& n.7 (2013) (discussing that change of venue statute 
should not create or multiply opportunities for forum 
shopping).  The underlying concern about 
gamesmanship applies with equal force here, and 
this Court should not allow such behavior to flourish 
by failing to provide a workable standard.  
3. The issue is also of critical importance to the 
numerous government officials who may invoke 
qualified immunity as a defense to litigation.  
Inconsistent standards hamper certainty and 
predictability for litigants, government officials, and 
the courts.  They also undercut the entire function of 
the clearly established prong: to provide reasonable 
notice to officials regarding the permissible bounds of 
their actions.  
This Court has previously recognized the 
important benefits of disposing unmeritorious claims 
as quickly as possible.  Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 
354 (2006) (noting that quick resolution of qualified 
immunity claims are “essential”).  To protect 
government officials against frivolous lawsuits, the 
Court has sought to fashion a qualified immunity 
standard that quickly disposes of such lawsuits.  See 
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009) 
(noting that parties should not endure the costs and 
delays of litigating constitutional questions if not 
necessary).  Accordingly, district court orders 
rejecting absolute immunity and qualified immunity 
are immediately appealable under the collateral 
order doctrine.  28 U.S.C. § 1291; Hallock, 546 U.S. 
at 350.  
The government has also confirmed the 
importance of qualified immunity in suits against 
government officials.  Recognizing the need for 
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skilled litigators to defend against “complex” and 
“cutting-edge questions of constitutional law,” in 
Bivens cases, the Justice Department created the 
Constitutional and Specialized Tort Litigation 
section.3  The Section aims to “avoid[] unnecessary 
discovery and the burdens and distractions on 
federal officials normally associated with taking 
cases against them to trial.”  The Section’s existence 
indicates the importance of qualified immunity to the 
government as a whole and the individual federal 
officials it represents.  
Moreover, a lack of clarity increases the costs of 
judicial decision making.  When this Court removed 
the mandatory nature of the two-step inquiry in 
adjudicating qualified immunity, it grounded its 
concerns in the fair and efficient disposition of 
constitutional tort cases.  Pearson, 555 U.S. at 821.  
These concerns are relevant here too; without clear 
standards, courts will continue to struggle with 
undertaking the clearly established inquiry. 
* * * 
An essential function of federal courts is 
preserving the “landmarks” of civil liberties, which 
are the foundational tenets of American democracy.  
Courts encounter qualified immunity in the vast 
majority of civil rights cases because the doctrine, 
when applicable, completely bars suit.  Mitchell v. 
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).  In light of its 
recurrence in the vast majority of cases seeking 
damages against government officials, the vexing 
                                            
3 Civil Torts, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ 
civil/torts/cstls/t-cstl.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
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issue of what constitutes clearly established law is of 
such extraordinary importance that it warrants 
review by this Court.  
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the petition should 
be granted and the judgment below reversed.  
Respectfully submitted, 
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APPENDIX A 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
 
No. 12-6608 
 
RICHARD ORTEGA, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, ET AL.,  
 Defendants-Appellees. 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville. 
No. 3:11-cv-00429—John G. Heyburn II, District 
Judge. 
 
Argued: October 8, 2013 
Decided and Filed: December 10, 2013 
 
Before: KEITH and SUTTON, Circuit Judges; 
BLACK, District Judge.* 
 
COUNSEL 
ARGUED: Brittany Sadler, WILLIAM & MARY 
LAW SCHOOL, Williamsburg, Virginia, for 
Appellant.  J. Max Weintraub, UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for 
Federal Appellees. Stephen P. Durham, 
                                            
* The Honorable Timothy S. Black, United States District Court 
Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.  
  
2a
JEFFERSON COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 
Louisville, Kentucky, for Louisville/Jefferson County 
Appellees.  ON BRIEF: Tillman J. Breckenridge, 
REED SMITH LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. 
J. Max Weintraub, UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for 
Federal Appellees. Stephen P. Durham, 
JEFFERSON COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 
Louisville, Kentucky, for Louisville/Jefferson County 
Appellees. 
 
SUTTON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in 
which BLACK, D. J., joined.  KEITH, J. (pp. 10–13), 
delivered a separate dissenting opinion. 
 
OPINION 
SUTTON, Circuit Judge.  
 
The United States Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement agency mistakenly issued a detainer for 
Richard Ortega.  Sent to the Louisville Metro 
Department of Corrections, the detainer informed 
the local prison authorities that the immigration 
agency was investigating whether Ortega, then 
serving a home-confinement sentence, could be 
removed from the United States.  Based on the 
detainer, the department moved Ortega to a local 
prison.  Ortega, who happened to be a United States 
citizen, sued, claiming due process and unreasonable 
seizure violations.  The defendants moved to dismiss 
on qualified immunity grounds, and the district court 
granted the motions. We affirm. 
 
I. 
Ortega began serving an eleven-day sentence of 
home confinement for driving under the influence on 
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March 18, 2011. Under the terms of his sentence, he 
had to wear an electronic monitoring device at all 
times.  With prior approval, he could go to work, the 
doctor and church.  Otherwise he had to stay at 
home. 
 
Soon after he began serving the sentence, the 
corrections department received a detainer for 
Ortega from federal immigration authorities. “A 
detainer is a request filed . . . with the institution in 
which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking the 
institution either to hold the prisoner for the agency 
or to notify the agency when release of the prisoner 
is imminent.” Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719 
(1985). In the normal course, the immigration agency 
receives notice of state and federal criminal 
convictions, after which it investigates to determine 
whether the individual entered the country legally.  
If the individual has violated the immigration laws, 
the agency usually begins removal proceedings. 
 
Immigration agent John Cloyd issued Ortega’s 
detainer after seeing his DUI conviction and after 
noticing that Ortega’s name and birth date 
resembled, though they did not exactly match, those 
of an unlawful alien.  The detainer informed the 
corrections department that the immigration agency 
was investigating whether Ortega entered the 
country legally. 
 
As a matter of policy, the local corrections 
department incarcerates any individual with an 
immigration detainer.  On March 19, officers Lori 
Eppler and William Skaggs took Ortega to the local 
jail, where he remained until his release on March 
22.  The corrections department did not conduct its 
own investigation of Ortega’s citizenship before 
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taking him to jail.  This Richard Ortega, as it turns 
out, is a United States citizen, subject to Kentucky’s 
drinking-and-driving laws but not subject to 
deportation under federal law. 
 
Ortega filed this lawsuit, raising a host of 
constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971).  Only two remain.  Ortega claims that the 
city’s officers (Eppler and Skaggs) violated his rights 
against deprivations of liberty without due process 
and against unreasonable seizures when they carried 
out the federal detainer and that the federal 
immigration agent (Cloyd) caused those violations by 
issuing the detainer. The district court dismissed 
both sets of claims on qualified immunity grounds. 
 
(On appeal, Ortega occasionally references other 
defendants and claims mentioned in his complaint. 
As the defendants point out, Ortega has forfeited 
these theories of relief because he did not develop 
them.  See United States v. Sandridge, 385 F.3d 
1032, 1035–36 (6th Cir. 2004).) 
 
II. 
Ortega’s appeal implicates two old qualified 
immunity questions: (1) Did the state and federal 
officials violate Ortega’s constitutional rights? (2) If 
so, were those rights clearly established at the time 
of the transfer? See Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 
2088, 2093 (2012). 
 
Ortega’s appeal also implicates two new 
constitutional law questions: (1) Does an individual 
serving a sentence through home confinement have a 
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause 
in not being moved to a traditional prison setting?  
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(2) Does that same individual have a right protected 
by the Fourth Amendment in not being moved to a 
traditional prison setting in the absence of probable 
cause? 
 
Before turning to these questions, it may help to 
explain how detainers traditionally work and why in 
the normal course they do not violate these 
constitutional guarantees.  Faced with limited 
resources, federal immigration authorities 
understandably pay attention to illegal immigrants 
who break other laws.  See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t 
Accountability Office, GAO-12-708, Secure 
Communities 6–13 (2012). Using a computer 
database, they determine whether individuals 
convicted of violating other local, state and federal 
laws have entered the country illegally.  If so, they 
issue a detainer to the law enforcement authority 
holding the individual, asking the institution to keep 
custody of the prisoner for the agency or to let the 
agency know when the prisoner is about to be 
released.  See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7. 
 
Federal detainers do not raise constitutional 
problems in the normal course.  If a local prison 
keeps tabs on someone until his release, even if it 
moves him from one prison setting to another, it is 
difficult to see how that continued custody is any 
business of the Due Process Clause or for that matter 
the Fourth Amendment.  See Sandin v. Conner, 515 
U.S. 472 (1995).  The same is true if the local prison 
merely notifies federal immigration authorities 
before the inmate’s release to allow them to take 
custody over him at the end of his prison sentence in 
order to begin removal proceedings. 
 
What happens, however, in other settings?  Say a 
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State authorizes the arrest of any person, in custody 
or not, subject to a federal immigration detainer.  See 
Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, No. 1:11-cv-708-SEB, 
2013 WL 1332158 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 28, 2013). Or say a 
State refuses to release a person who has posted bail 
because of an immigration detainer.  See Galarza v. 
Szalczyk, No. 10-cv-6815, 2012 WL 1080020 (E.D. 
Pa. Mar. 30, 2012).  Or say a State keeps a person 
serving a sentence of weekend confinement in jail 
because of an immigration detainer.  See Rodriguez 
v. Aitken, No. 13-551-SC, 2013 WL 3337766 (N.D. 
Cal. July 1, 2013).  Or say, as in our case, the 
individual is on home confinement, and the local 
officials move him to a traditional prison setting 
based on the federal detainer. In these other 
settings, including most pertinently ours, the matter 
is more complicated. 
 
Due Process.  When an individual violates a 
criminal law and receives a sentence, he usually 
cannot be heard to complain about the deprivations 
of liberty that result.  Although “prisoners do not 
shed all constitutional rights at the prison gate, . . . 
lawful incarceration brings about the necessary 
withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and 
rights, a retraction justified by the considerations 
underlying our penal system.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 
485. That is why, when prison authorities move an 
inmate from one cell to another, even to a cell with 
far fewer privileges, the increased deprivation 
generally does not implicate a protected liberty 
interest under the Due Process Clause. “The 
Constitution does not . . . guarantee that the 
convicted prisoner will be placed in any particular 
prison.”  Meacham v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976). 
 
And the Constitution does not prevent a prison 
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transfer to a more restrictive setting unless the 
change would work an “atypical and significant 
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 
incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. 
 
While this line of authority works against 
Ortega’s claim, it does not defeat it.  A transfer from 
home confinement to prison confinement, it seems to 
us, amounts to a sufficiently severe change in 
conditions to implicate due process.  Yes, both 
settings involve confinement, a reality confirmed by 
the fact that Ortega must wear an electronic 
monitoring device at all times, by the fact that he 
must obtain permission to leave the home and may 
do so only for discrete reasons and by the fact he 
would be prosecuted for escape if he did not comply. 
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 532.200(2). But the two settings of 
confinement still amount to significant differences in 
kind, not degree.  A prison cot is not the same as a 
bed, a cell not the same as a home, from every 
vantage point: privacy, companionship, comfort. And 
the privileges available in each are worlds apart—
from eating prison food in a cell to eating one’s own 
food at home, from working in a prison job to 
working in one’s current job, from attending religious 
services in the prison to attending one’s own church, 
from watching television with other inmates in a 
common area to watching television with one’s 
family and friends at home, from visiting a prison 
doctor to visiting one’s own doctor. See Ky. Rev. Stat. 
§ 532.200(1).  These marked disparities between 
individual liberty in the one setting as opposed to the 
other suffice to trigger due process. 
 
What process is due will vary from setting to 
setting and may well turn on the notice given to the 
individual before he was allowed to serve a prison 
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sentence at home.  Happily for us, we need not 
answer these more difficult questions today.  In a 
qualified immunity case, a court may reject the 
constitutional claim on either of two grounds—either 
because no such constitutional right existed or 
because the constitutional right was not clearly 
established at the time of the incident.  As the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged, lower courts are 
free to resolve (and it is often more efficient to 
resolve) qualified-immunity cases based on the 
second prong—that the contours of the constitutional 
right were not clearly established at the time. 
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Just 
so here. 
 
A clearly established constitutional violation 
requires on-point, controlling authority or a “robust 
consensus of cases of persuasive authority.”  Ashcroft 
v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (2011) (quotation 
omitted). As of March 2011, no controlling authority 
or consensus of persuasive authority established that 
Ortega had a liberty interest in remaining on home 
confinement. 
 
The relevant Supreme Court precedent at the 
time dealt only with traditional confinement and 
probation or parole.  See Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 
143, 147–53 (1997); Sandin, supra; Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781–82 (1973); Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). Ortega’s case falls 
somewhere between traditional confinement and 
probation/parole, and the Supreme Court has not 
addressed such a case. 
 
The Sixth Circuit has not addressed an in-
between case like Ortega’s either.  The closest case, 
Ganem v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization 
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Serv., 825 F.2d 410 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) 
(unpublished), hurts rather than helps Ortega’s 
cause.  It involved a federal prisoner whose prison 
classification changed because of an immigration 
detainer.  The court held that a “detainer which 
adversely affects a prisoner’s classification and 
eligibility for rehabilitative programs does not 
activate a due process right.”  Id. at 410. Even then, 
Ganem does not speak to the question here—whether 
a home confinee should be thought of as a prisoner 
without a liberty interest in avoiding a transfer to 
prison or as a probationer/parolee with such a liberty 
interest. 
 
In the absence of Supreme Court or Sixth Circuit 
authority, Ortega points to three cases as evidence of 
a “robust consensus” of persuasive authority 
establishing a liberty interest in home confinement. 
In one, a probationer challenged the revocation of his 
probation, the first six months of which were to be 
served on home confinement. Paige v. Hudson, 341 
F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2003).  The Seventh Circuit (in 
dicta) stated that the probationer had a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
remaining on home confinement.  Id. at 643–44. In 
another, the same court dealt with the imprisonment 
of a person serving a sentence that included a short 
time in jail followed by home confinement. See 
Domka v. Portage Cnty., 523 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 
2008). There the court stated (again in dicta) that 
Paige was not “necessarily controlling” because 
“Domka was not a probationer but instead a prisoner 
serving his time outside the jail.”  Id. In the third 
case, a group of prisoners released into home 
confinement challenged their reimprisonment. 
Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864 (1st Cir. 
2010). The First Circuit concluded (here too in dicta) 
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that home confinement sufficiently resembles 
probation and parole to create a protected liberty 
interest in remaining on home 
confinement.  Id. at 890. 
 
These three cases are neither robust in their 
relevant analyses nor evidence of an on-point 
consensus.  The decisions from both circuits 
undermine the central premise of Ortega’s claims by 
noting that today’s question—whether initial home 
confinement gives rise to a protected liberty 
interest—is an open one.  See Gonzalez-Fuentes, 607 
F.3d at 887 (“How the Due Process Clause should 
apply to the liberty interests of prisoners serving 
sentences in alternative forms of confinement 
remains an open question.”); Domka, 523 F.3d at 781 
(describing the “law in a case such as this, where the 
convict is not technically ‘imprisoned,’ [as] still 
evolving”). True, both courts concluded that a person 
released from prison into home confinement has a 
protected liberty interest in remaining on home 
confinement. But Ortega’s case is different, since he 
can “appropriately be characterized as a prisoner 
serving a portion of his confinement in a different 
location from prison.”  Domka, 523 F.3d at 781 & n.3. 
That difference explains why the Seventh Circuit 
suggested that someone in Ortega’s position might 
not have a protected liberty interest in remaining on 
home confinement.  See id.  The officers could have 
reasonably thought the same thing, meaning their 
actions at worst reflected a “reasonable but mistaken 
judgment[] about [an] open legal question[].” Al-
Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2085.  The point of qualified 
immunity is to protect just such judgments. 
 
Fourth Amendment.  A similar problem 
undermines Ortega’s Fourth Amendment claim—
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namely, no relevant authority existed at the time of 
the incident.  A Fourth Amendment seizure requires 
“a governmental termination of freedom of 
movement through means intentionally applied.” 
Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596–97 (1989). 
As of March 2011, no controlling authority 
established that moving a convict from home 
confinement to prison confinement resulted in a new 
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 
The few cases to discuss seizure claims by those 
already confined suggest that the “freedom of 
movement” and “protected liberty interest” inquiries 
overlap.  See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 
(9th Cir. 2000) (“[B]ecause Plaintiff had no protected 
liberty interest in not being confined in the SHU, he 
fails to state a Fourth Amendment claim.”); Leslie v. 
Doyle, 125 F.3d 1132, 1135–36 (7th Cir. 1997) (“We 
see no reason . . . why a prisoner’s liberty interest 
under [the Search and Seizure and Due Process 
Clauses] would differ.”). The open question raised by 
Ortega’s due process claim thus spills over into this 
claim: Should a home confinee be thought of as a 
prisoner without freedom of movement or as a 
probationer/parolee with freedom of movement? 
 
This open question requires a conclusion that 
“the contours of [a home confinee’s right against 
unreasonable seizures was not] sufficiently clear that 
a reasonable official would understand that [a 
transfer from home confinement to jail] violates that 
right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 
(1987). The individual defendants reasonably could 
have thought that transferring Ortega to jail would 
not terminate his “freedom of movement” within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment because home 
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confinement serves as an off-the-premises jail.  Just 
as qualified immunity applies to Ortega’s due 
process claim, it thus also applies to his illegal-
seizure claim. 
 
The dissent agrees with our first assessment 
(that, for purposes of due process and unreasonable 
seizure protections, home confinement differs 
materially from in-prison confinement) but not with 
our second (that the right was not clearly established 
at the time of the relevant events). Because qualified 
immunity protects all but “the plainly incompetent,” 
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986), because, 
as the dissent’s own cases reveal, no appellate court 
holdings had addressed this issue at the time of the 
detainer, and because no material fact disputes cloud 
these explanations, the district court properly 
granted qualified immunity to the defendants. 
 
III. 
 
For these reasons, we affirm. 
 
DISSENT 
DAMON J. KEITH, dissenting.   
 
Because I disagree with the majority’s view that 
Ortega did not have a “clearly established” liberty 
interest in home confinement, I respectfully dissent. 
 
I address Ortega’s claims against the Louisville 
Metro Department of Corrections (“Metro 
Defendants”) and Immigration agent John Cloyd 
(“Cloyd”) separately. 
 
Metro Defendants 
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The facts of this case are such that the 
unlawfulness of Metro Defendants’ conduct is readily 
apparent, even in the absence of clarifying case law. 
Metro Defendants seized Ortega, an American-born, 
United States citizen, from his home and took him to 
jail for four days, based upon an improper detainer, 
without a warrant or any semblance of process.  In 
doing so, Metro Defendants did not allow him to 
produce any documentation that he was an American 
citizen.  As this Court has recently explained: 
 
“[O]utrageous conduct will obviously be 
unconstitutional” without regard to 
precedent because “the easiest cases don’t 
even arise.” Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 
v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377, 129 S.Ct. 
2633, 174 L.Ed.2d 354 (2009) (brackets and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  And 
even in cases involving less than outrageous 
conduct, “officials can still be on notice that 
their conduct violates established law in 
novel factual circumstances.”  Id. at 377–78, 
129 S.Ct. 2633 (ellipses and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
Quigley v. Tuong Vinh Thai, 707 F.3d 675, 684 (6th 
Cir. 2013). 
 
Not only should the officers have known that 
removing someone from their home and taking them 
to jail requires a certain minimum level of process, 
but in my view, the relevant case law clearly 
establishes that criminal defendants have a 
constitutional due process right to remain in home 
confinement. 
 
Confinement in the home is inherently different 
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from confinement in jail.  The majority concedes this 
point, holding that the distinction between the two 
settings of confinement amounts to a “difference[] in 
kind, not degree.” Indeed, the terms of Ortega’s plea 
agreement provided that Ortega would serve his 
sentence through Kentucky’s Home Incarceration 
Program, a creation of Kentucky law.  Under the 
program, Ortega was allowed to eat foods of his 
choice, sleep in his own bed, report to work, and 
attend religious services each day. As the majority 
correctly points out, “[t]hese marked disparities 
between the liberty in the one setting as opposed to 
the other suffice to trigger due process.” 
 
Nevertheless, the majority dismisses Ortega’s 
claims based on the second prong of the qualified 
immunity test, holding that “no controlling authority 
or consensus of persuasive authority established that 
Ortega had a liberty interest in remaining on home 
confinement.” This conclusion is untenable. Clearly 
established rights include not only those specifically 
adjudicated, but also those that are established by 
general applications of core constitutional principles. 
See, e.g., Quigley, 707 F.3d at 685 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(“That there is no federal case directly on point does 
not undermine [the] conclusion [that] [t]he principle 
at issue—namely, that a doctor cannot ‘consciously 
expos[e a] patient to an excessive risk of serious 
harm’ while providing medical treatment—is 
enshrined in our case law.”). 
 
Here, the core constitutional principle—that an 
officer must provide some process before seizing an 
individual from his home and taking him to jail—is 
unquestionably enshrined in our case law. 
Admittedly, the Supreme Court and this Court have 
only explained this principle in the probation and 
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parole contexts.  See, e.g., Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 
143, 147-53 (1997); Sneed v. Donahue, 993 F.2d 1239, 
1241 (6th Cir. 1993). Surely, however, the test for 
determining whether a constitutional right was 
clearly established does not require a plaintiff to 
demonstrate that “the very action in question has 
previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in 
the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be 
apparent.”  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 
(1987). Indeed, in this case, the unlawfulness of 
Metro Defendants’ actions clearly was apparent. 
 
The majority’s cursory dismissal of analogous 
cases from the First and Seventh Circuits, see 
Gonzales-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864 (1st Cir. 
2010); Domka v. Portage Cnty., 523 F.3d 776 (7th 
Cir. 2008); and Paige v. Hudson, 341 F.3d 642 (7th 
Cir. 2003), as “neither robust in their relevant 
analyses nor evidence of an on-point consensus” 
misses the point.  At a minimum, those decisions 
firmly establish that an individual serving a 
sentence outside of prison is entitled to some 
minimum amount of process before being arrested 
and taken to jail. See also Kim v. Hurston, 182 F.3d 
113, 118-20 (2d Cir. 1999); Edwards v. Lockhart, 908 
F.2d 299, 302 (8th Cir. 1990).1 
 
                                            
1 We note further that in 2011, the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania evaluated the above-cited cases and decided the 
precise question in this case in the affirmative, holding that 
“the Fourteenth Amendment demands some minimal process 
before a state actor takes someone who is set to serve his 
sentence at home, on electronic monitoring, and instead puts 
him in prison or another form of ‘institutional confinement.’” 
McBride v. Cahoone, 820 F. Supp. 2d 623, 631 (E.D. Pa. 2011). 
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The majority’s holding allows an officer to 
blatantly violate the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights of an American citizen—so long 
as it was done in a manner that neither this Court 
nor the Supreme Court has directly opined on 
before—with impunity.  This cannot be the intent of 
the qualified immunity doctrine. 
 
ICE Defendant Cloyd 
 
Although the majority fails to distinguish 
between Ortega’s claims against Metro Defendants 
and ICE Agent Cloyd, the facts of this case call for a 
separate analysis as to each Defendant’s liability. 
 
It is undisputed that Cloyd improperly issuance 
a detainer against Ortega.  It is also undisputed that 
Cloyd’s actions were a proximate and but-for cause of 
Ortega’s removal from home confinement and 
subsequent incarceration. Having established that 
Ortega had a clearly established liberty interest in 
remaining in home confinement, Cloyd may be liable 
for violating Ortega’s rights. See Powers v. Hamilton 
Cnty. Public Defender Com’n, 501 F.3d 592, 608 (6th 
Cir. 2007). Accordingly, I believe the district court’s 
dismissal of Ortega’s claims against Cloyd was 
improper. 
 
A complaint may only be dismissed “if it is clear 
that no violation of a clearly established 
constitutional right could be found under any set of 
facts that could be proven consistent with the 
allegations or pleadings.”  Jackson v. Schultz, 429 
F.3d 586, 589 (6th Cir. 2005). In reviewing a motion 
to dismiss, we “construe the complaint in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations 
as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor 
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of the plaintiff.”  Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 
Ortega alleges that Cloyd improperly issued an 
immigration detainer against him, despite the fact 
that he was an American-born United States citizen. 
Cloyd argues that this erroneous issuance of the 
detainer was due to the fact that Ortega had a 
similar, but not identical name and birth date as an 
individual who had previously been deported. The 
district court referred to this as “an unfortunate but 
honest mistake.”  R. 48 at 343. But the district court 
could not possibly have assessed the reasonableness 
of Cloyd’s error because the detainer was not part of 
the record at the motion to dismiss stage.  There is 
simply no way to know how similar the names and 
birth dates of the two individuals were without 
analyzing the detainer itself. 
 
Moreover, even taking Cloyd’s argument on its 
face, it is unclear what relationship—beyond a 
shared ethnic background—Ortega had with an 
individual who had already been removed from the 
country. To allow ICE to issue a detainer against an 
American citizen, with unlimited discretion and 
without any accountability, sets a dangerous 
precedent and offends any and all notions of due 
process.  Because a reasonable factfinder could 
conclude, after carefully evaluating the detainer, 
that Cloyd intentionally and improperly issued the 
detainer against Ortega, I believe dismissal was 
improper. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I do not agree that the 
claims against either of the defendants should have 
been dismissed.  I dissent.  
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APPENDIX B 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
AT LOUISVILLE 
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11-CV-00429-H 
 
RICHARD ORTEGA,    PLAINTIFF 
 
v. 
 
JOHN T. CLOYD, AGENT IN          DEFENDANTS 
THE EMPLOY OF U.S.  
IMMIGRATION AND 
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 
 
and, 
 
LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY 
METRO GOVERNMENT 
 
and, 
 
MARK BOLTON, DIRECTOR 
LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY METRO 
CORRECTIONS 
 
and, 
 
WILLIAM SKAGGS AND LORI EPPLER, 
OFFICERS IN THE EMPLOY OF LOUISVILLE/ 
JEFFERSON COUNT METRO CORRECTIONS. 
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
 
Plaintiff, Richard Ortega, brought this action 
against officers and agents of United States 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and 
Louisville Metro Corrections (“Metro Corrections”), 
for alleged constitutional violations.  This case has 
endured several procedural twists and turns before 
finally settling in federal court.  The Court is now 
confronted with unusual and unfortunate 
circumstance which, nevertheless, yield a clear 
result. 
 
While on home incarceration, Ortega was 
detained by Metro Corrections Officers based upon 
the existence of an ICE detainer indicating that 
Ortega was an illegal alien.  As it turned out, the 
information which justified the detainer was 
misapplied, as Ortega is a U.S. citizen. Ortega sued 
the state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and federal 
officials under a Bivens claim.  Both sets of 
Defendants have each moved separately to dismiss 
based on failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be grated and qualified immunity. For judicial 
economy purposes, the Court will address both 
motions in this opinion.  For the following reasons, 
the Court will sustain the motions to dismiss. 
 
I. 
 
On March 18, 2011, Ortega entered a guilty plea 
and was convicted in Jefferson County District Court 
of Driving under the Influence, First Offense. State 
District Court Judge Armstrong entered an order 
immediately sentencing Ortega to eleven days of 
home incarceration.  The next day, on March 19, 
2011, Metro Corrections Officers William Skaggs and 
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Lori Eppler removed Ortega from his home and 
placed him in jail based on an ICE-issued detainer. 
The complaint alleges that ICE Agent John T. Cloyd 
improperly issued the ICE detainer when he 
mistakenly confused Ortega with an illegal alien that 
has a very similar name and birth date.  The 
detainer was invalid, as Ortega is an U.S. citizen.  
Ortega contends that Metro Corrections has a 
“longstanding policy to incarcerate any individual 
who currently had an ICE detainer on him or her.”  
Consequently, Metro Correction officers detained 
Ortega and he remained in jail until March 22, 
2011.1 
 
On August 25, 2011, Ortega brought this action 
asserting constitutional violations pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 against Metro Corrections and its 
officers (collectively “Metro Defendants”).  He also 
brought a Bivens claim against ICE and its officers 
(collectively “Federal Defendants”).2  “Both Bivens 
                                            
1 Defendant Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government 
contends that Ortega remained in custody until March 23, 
2011, the date Judge Armstrong ordered his release. The date 
of release is not material and has no bearing on the Court’s 
analysis. 
2 Ortega initially filed suit against Federal Defendants United 
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE’s 
supervisory personnel Richard A. Wong and John Morton, and 
Unknown Agents and Employees in the Employ of ICE. The 
Federal Defendants moved to dismiss the claims against them, 
based on the agency’s sovereign immunity, and the qualified 
immunity of the remaining Defendants. On April 27, 2012, this 
Court entered an Order dismissing Federal Defendants Morton, 
Wong and United States Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement agency from this action, but retained in the action 
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and § 1983 allow a plaintiff to seek money damages 
from government officials who have violated” 
constitutional rights.  Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 
609 (1999). Ortega alleged violations of the Fourth, 
Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
 
Metro Defendants have moved to dismiss the 
claim for failure to state a claim and/or based on 
qualified immunity.  The remaining Federal 
Defendant, ICE Agent Cloyd, has also moved to 
dismiss on the same grounds.  Given the different 
position of Defendants, the Court will analyze 
separately whether Ortega has stated a plausible 
claim for constitutional violations against each 
defendant. 
 
II. 
 
Ortega brings this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against Metro Defendants for violations of the 
Fourth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, Due 
Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause. Under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, “an individual may bring a private 
right of action against anyone who, under color of 
state law, deprives a person of rights, privileges, or 
                                                                                          
the Unknown Agent and Employees in the Employ of ICE. This 
Court ordered ICE to identify all ICE Agents who were involved 
in Ortega’s ICE detainer. ICE complied, naming Agent Cloyd. 
Accordingly, the only Federal Defendant that remains is ICE 
Agent Cloyd. With respect to Metro Corrections Defendants, 
Ortega’s First Amended Complaint names Louisville/Jefferson 
County Metro Government, Director of Metro Corrections Mark 
Bolton in his individual capacity, and Metro Corrections 
Officers Eppler and Skaggs.  All Metro Defendants remain in 
the action. 
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immunities secured by the Constitution of conferred 
by federal statute.” Bletz v. Gribble, 641 F.3d 743, 
749 (6th Cir. 2011).  “To state a claim under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must set forth facts, when 
construed favorably, establish (1) the deprivation of a 
right secured by the Constitution of laws of the 
United States (2) caused by a person acting under 
the color of state law.”  Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509 
F.3d 234, 243 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations 
omitted).  Government officials, however, may be 
immune from liability for their constitutional 
violations under the doctrine of qualified immunity. 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Qualified 
immunity is designed to shield government officials 
from actions “insofar as their conduct does not 
violate a clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known.” Id. at 818. The Sixth Circuit 
uses a two-step inquiry to assess qualified immunity: 
“(1) whether, considering the allegations in a light 
most favorable to the party injured, a constitutional 
right has been violated, and (2) whether that right 
was clearly established.”  Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 
282, 290 (6th Cir. 2010)(internal quotations omitted). 
For a constitutional right to be “clearly established,” 
the “contours of the right must be sufficiently clear 
that a reasonable [government official] would 
understand that what he is doing violates that 
right.” Harris v. City of Circleville, 583 F.3d 356, 
366-67 (6th Cir. 2009). Therefore, dismissal based on 
qualified immunity is proper if the official was 
unaware that his or her conduct was clearly 
unlawful.  See Bletz, 641 F.3d at 749. 
 
A court is permitted to consider the two-part test 
in whatever order is appropriate and may begin with 
the second inquiry. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 
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223, 236 (2009). The Court will address each alleged 
constitutional violation individually. Under each 
claim, the facts and law appear to present clearly 
circumstances under which the Metro Defendants 
are entitled to qualified immunity. 
 
A. 
 
First, Ortega alleges a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches 
and seizures. Ortega argues that the Metro 
Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights 
when Metro Corrections Officers Eppler and Skaggs 
seized Ortega, removed him from his home and 
transferred him to the Metro Corrections facility. 
Metro Defendants counter based on qualified 
immunity by arguing that they would not have 
reason to know the detainer was faulty and thus 
moving Ortega from one place of confinement to 
another was reasonable under the circumstances. 
This Court agrees. 
 
No evidence suggests that the Metro Defendants 
had reason to believe ICE’s detainer was unlawful. 
They carried out a rather routine seizure quite 
unaware that the information used to generate the 
detainer was misapplied.  Thus their action in 
serving a detainer on Ortega and moving him from 
one place of confinement to another was reasonable 
under the circumstances.  Accordingly, Metro 
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. 
 
B. 
 
Next, Ortega alleges a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment which prohibits cruel and unusual 
punishment. It is unclear which actions Ortega 
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alleges constitute such a claim.  Moreover, other 
than a conclusory statement that the actions of 
Metro Defendants amounted to “cruel and unusual 
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment,” Ortega’s complaint is scant with facts 
supporting a claim for an Eighth Amendment 
violation. See Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 
795 (6th Cir. 2008)(“To move beyond the pleading 
stage . . ., an inmate must allege that he has been 
deprived a minimal civilized measure of life’s 
necessities.”). Ortega’s memoranda never addresses 
this constitutional violation. 
 
Regardless, the facts in this case fall short of 
supporting an Eighth Amendment violation. Ortega 
was detained, albeit in a different location, for a 
period of imprisonment that was no longer than the 
sentence imposed by Judge Armstrong.  Nothing 
about the period of his confinement or the conditions 
of his confinement were disproportionately harsh. 
Accordingly, Ortega has failed to articulate an 
Eighth Amendment violation. 
 
C. 
 
Ortega has alleged that Metro Defendants’ 
actions violated the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment by transferring him from 
home incarceration to the Metro Corrections facility 
during his sentence.  The due process clause 
prohibits a state from depriving a defendant of 
liberty without due process of law.  In the case of a 
defendant lawfully convicted of a crime, “he loses a 
significant interest in his liberty for the period of his 
sentence.” Gaston v. Taylor, 946 F.2d 340, 343 (4th 
Cir. 1991). Even assuming Ortega could establish a 
liberty interest in home confinement when he has 
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been so sentenced, the Court concludes that Metro 
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity based 
on the second prong of the qualified immunity 
analysis, that the right was clearly established.3  See 
Colvin, 605 F.3d at 290 (“We are free to consider [the 
two-part test] in whatever order is appropriate in 
light of the issues before us, and therefore need not 
decide whether there was a constitutional violation if 
we determine that an official in [Defendant’s] 
position would reasonably believe that his actions 
were not in contravention of [Plaintiff’s] 
constitutional rights”)(internal quotations omitted). 
 
The relevant inquiry in determining whether a 
right is clearly established is whether it would be 
clear to a reasonable agent in the defendant’s 
position that his conduct was unlawful.  Brosseau v. 
Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004).  Here, Metro 
Defendants would have to be aware that in 
transferring Ortega they violated his liberty interest. 
Metro Defendants acted pursuant to a detainer.  The 
government has a significant interest in detaining 
certain aliens who are flight risks while the 
government’s removal decisions are pending.  See 
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523-25 (2003).  Metro 
Defendants honored the detainer and had no reason 
to believe it was incorrect.  It was thus reasonable for 
the Metro Defendants to remove Ortega from home 
incarceration based upon the policy that aliens 
                                            
3 The Court need not decide whether Ortega has articulated a 
cognizable liberty interest for purposes of this analysis because 
qualified immunity is found based on the second prong. 
Moreover, case law is varied in determining whether changes to 
an inmate’s conditions of confinement implicate a liberty 
interest. The Court does not intend to add to this issue. 
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present a risk of evading immigration authorities. In 
this situation, the Court finds Metro Defendants 
could have reasonably believed that their conduct 
was lawful.  Accordingly, Metro Defendants are 
entitled to qualified immunity on this claim as well. 
 
D. 
 
Lastly, Ortega alleges Metro Defendants failed to 
provide equal protection of the laws to American 
citizens of Hispanic descent.  Ortega’s Second 
Amendment Complaint alleges “it was [Metro] 
Defendant’s long-standing policy to incarcerate any 
individual who currently has an ICE detainer on him 
or her.” Taking Ortega’s allegations as true, he was 
not treated differently than any other person who is 
subject to an ICE detainer as Metro Defendants 
evidently incarcerate every individual subject to a 
detainer.  He was not detained due to his Hispanic 
ethnicity; rather he was incarcerated because ICE 
lodged a detainer on him.  Ortega has failed to 
plausibly allege Metro Defendants violated his right 
to equal protection. 
III. 
Ortega brings a Bivens claim against ICE Agent 
Cloyd for violating his Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
rights. ICE Agent Cloyd has moved to dismiss based 
on Ortega’s failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted and the doctrine of qualified 
immunity.  The qualified immunity analysis is 
identical in suits under § 1983 and Bivens.  Wilson, 
526 U.S. at 609. Because the alleged constitutional 
violations fail for the same reason, the Court will 
address the two violations together. 
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Ortega alleges that ICE Agent Cloyd issued an 
invalid detainer, “causing an unreasonable seizure of 
his person and a restraint of his liberty” in violation 
of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.4  According to 
Ortega’s complaint, Agent Cloyd improperly issued 
the ICE detainer as a result of another illegal alien 
having a similar name and birth date as Ortega. 
Qualified immunity shields government officials who 
make objectively reasonable mistakes in 
discretionary decisions within the scope of their 
responsibilities.  Hensley v. Gassman, 693 F.3d 681, 
687 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 
An ICE agent could reasonably but erroneously 
issue a detainer for a U.S. citizen if there is an error 
in its database or if the individual’s name is similar 
to someone else who is in the database.  As alleged, 
the illegal alien and Ortega had very similar names 
and birth dates.  It is entirely plausible that ICE 
Agent Cloyd was unaware that he was issuing an 
unlawful detainer and thus could have not known 
that he violated Ortega’s “clearly established” right. 
ICE Agent Cloyd was acting within the scope of his 
employment when he made an unfortunate but 
honest mistake and is consequently entitled to 
qualified immunity. Accordingly, Ortega’s claims fail 
as a matter of law. 
 
The Court recognizes the ongoing confusion 
regarding proper boundaries and communications 
between ICE and local law enforcement. 
                                            
4 With respect to the Fourth Amendment claim, this Court 
previously found ICE issuing a detainer caused Ortega’s 
incarceration. This allowed Ortega to proceed with this Fourth 
Amendment claim against ICE Agent Cloyd. 
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Unfortunately, mistakes happen.  However, the 
circumstances in this case do not rise to the level of 
constitutional violations for which Plaintiff pursue 
claims. 
 
Being otherwise sufficiently advised, 
 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Federal 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is 
SUSTAINED. 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Metro 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is 
SUSTAINED. 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all of 
Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED WITH 
PREJUDICE. 
 
November 16, 2012          s/ John G. Heyburn II 
         John G. Heyburn II, Judge 
         United States District Court 
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APPENDIX C 
UNITED STATES CODE 
TITLE 42—THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND 
WELFARE 
CHAPTER 21—CIVIL RIGHTS 
SUBCHAPTER I. GENERALLY 
 
Sec. 1983.  Civil action for deprivation of rights 
 
Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress, except that in any action brought against a 
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such 
officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not 
be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated 
or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the 
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress 
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia 
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of 
Columbia. 
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CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
TITLE 8—ALIENS AND NATIONALITY 
CHAPTER I. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY 
SUBCHAPTER B. IMMIGRATION REGULA-
TIONS 
PART 287.  FIELD OFFICERS; POWERS AND 
DUTIES 
 
Sec. 287.7 Detainer provisions under section 
287(d)(3) of the Act. 
 
(a) Detainers in general. Detainers are issued 
pursuant to sections 236 and 287 of the Act and this 
chapter 1. Any authorized immigration officer may at 
any time issue a Form I–247, Immigration Detainer–
Notice of Action, to any other Federal, State, or local 
law enforcement agency. A detainer serves to advise 
another law enforcement agency that the 
Department seeks custody of an alien presently in 
the custody of that agency, for the purpose of 
arresting and removing the alien. The detainer is a 
request that such agency advise the Department, 
prior to release of the alien, in order for the 
Department to arrange to assume custody, in 
situations when gaining immediate physical custody 
is either impracticable or impossible. 
(b) Authority to issue detainers. The following 
officers are authorized to issue detainers: 
(1) Border patrol agents, including aircraft pilots; 
(2) Special agents; 
(3) Deportation officers; 
(4) Immigration inspectors; 
(5) Adjudications officers; 
(6) Immigration enforcement agents; 
(7) Supervisory and managerial personnel who are 
responsible for supervising the activities of those 
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officers listed in this paragraph; and 
(8) Immigration officers who need the authority to 
issue detainers under section 287(d)(3) of the Act in 
order to effectively accomplish their individual 
missions and who are designated individually or as a 
class, by the Commissioner of CBP, the Assistant 
Secretary for ICE, or the Director of the USCIS. 
 
(c) Availability of records. In order for the 
Department to accurately determine the propriety of 
issuing a detainer, serving a notice to appear, or 
taking custody of an alien in accordance with this 
section, the criminal justice agency requesting such 
action or informing the Department of a conviction or 
act that renders an alien inadmissible or removable 
under any provision of law shall provide the 
Department with all documentary records and 
information available from the agency that 
reasonably relates to the alien’s status in the United 
States, or that may have an impact on conditions of 
release. 
 
(d) Temporary detention at Department request. 
Upon a determination by the Department to issue a 
detainer for an alien not otherwise detained by a 
criminal justice agency, such agency shall maintain 
custody of the alien for a period not to exceed 48 
hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays 
in order to permit assumption of custody by the 
Department. 
 
(e) Financial responsibility for detention. No detainer 
issued as a result of a determination made under 
this chapter I shall incur any fiscal obligation on the 
part of the Department, until actual assumption of 
custody by the Department, except as provided in 
paragraph (d) of this section. 
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BALDWIN’S KENTUCKY REVISED STATUTES 
ANNOTATED 
 
TITLE L—KENTUCKY PENAL CODE 
CHAPTER 532—CLASSIFICATION AND 
DESIGNATION OF OFFENSES; AUTHORIZED 
DISPOSITION 
 
Sec. 532.200 Definitions for KRS 532.210 to 
532.250  
 
As used in KRS 532.210 to 532.250, unless the 
context otherwise requires: 
 
(1) “Home” means the temporary or permanent 
residence of a defendant consisting of the actual 
living area. If more than one (1) residence or family 
is located on a single piece of property, “home” does 
not include the residence of any other person who is 
not part of the social unit formed by the defendant’s 
immediate family. A hospital, nursing care facility, 
hospice, half-way house, group home, residential 
treatment facility, or boarding house may serve as a 
“home” under this section; 
 
(2) “Home incarceration” means the use of a 
monitoring device approved by the commissioner of 
the Department of Corrections to facilitate a 
prisoner’s ability to maintain gainful employment or 
to participate in programs approved as a condition of 
his or her incarceration, or both, using the person’s 
home for purposes of confinement; 
 
(3) “Violent felony offense” means an offense defined 
in KRS 507.020 (murder), 507.030 (manslaughter in 
the first degree), 508.010 (assault in the first degree), 
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508.020 (assault in the second degree), 509.040 
(kidnapping), 510.040 (rape in the first degree), 
510.070 (sodomy in the first degree), 510.110 (sexual 
abuse in the first degree), 511.020 (burglary in the 
first degree), 513.020 (arson in the first degree), 
513.030 (arson in the second degree), 513.040 (arson 
in the third degree), 515.020 (robbery in the first 
degree), 515.030 (robbery in the second degree), 
520.020 (escape in the first degree), any criminal 
attempt to commit the offense (KRS 506.010), or 
conviction as a persistent felony offender (KRS 
532.080) when the offender has a felony conviction 
for any of the above-listed offenses within the five (5) 
year period preceding the date of the latest 
conviction; 
 
(4) “Terminal illness” means a medically recognized 
disease for which the prognosis is death within six 
(6) months to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty; and 
 
(5) “Approved monitoring device” means an 
electronic device or apparatus which is capable of 
recording, tracking, or transmitting information as to 
the prisoner’s location or verifying the prisoner’s 
presence or non-presence in the home, or both. The 
devices shall be minimally intrusive. Devices shall 
not be used without the prisoner’s knowledge to 
record or transmit: 
(a) Visual images other than the defendant’s face; 
(b) Oral or wire communications or any auditory 
sound other than the defendant’s voice; or 
(c) Information as to the prisoner’s activities while 
inside the home. 
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Sec. 532.210 Petition; Study of Record; Order 
 
(1) Any misdemeanant or a felon who has not been 
convicted of, pled guilty to, or entered an Alford plea 
to a violent felony offense may petition the 
sentencing court for an order directing that all or a 
portion of a sentence of imprisonment in the county 
jail be served under conditions of home incarceration. 
Such petitions may be considered and ruled upon by 
the sentencing court prior to and throughout the 
term of the defendant’s sentence. 
 
(2) The sentencing judge shall study the record of all 
persons petitioning for home incarceration and, in 
his discretion, may: 
(a) Cause additional background or character 
information to be collected or reduced to writing by 
the county jailer or misdemeanor supervision 
department; 
(b) Conduct hearings on the desirability of granting 
home incarceration; 
(c) Impose on the home incarceree such conditions as 
are fit, including restitution; 
(d) Order that all or a portion of a sentence of 
imprisonment in the county jail be served under 
conditions of home incarceration at whatever time or 
intervals, consecutive or nonconsecutive, as the court 
shall determine. The time actually spent in home 
incarceration pursuant to this provision shall not 
exceed six (6) months or the maximum term of 
imprisonment assessed pursuant to this chapter 
whichever is the shorter; 
(e) Issue warrants for persons when there is reason 
to believe they have violated the conditions of home 
incarceration, conduct hearings on such matters, and 
order reimprisonment in the county jail upon proof of 
violation; and 
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(f) Grant final discharge from incarceration. 
 
(3) All home incarcerees shall execute a written 
agreement with the court setting forth all of the 
conditions of home incarceration. The order of home 
incarceration shall incorporate that agreement and 
order compliance with its terms. The order and 
agreement shall be transmitted to the supervising 
authority and to the appropriate jail official. 
 
(4) Time spent in home incarceration under this 
subsection shall be credited against the maximum 
term of imprisonment assessed for the defendant 
pursuant to this chapter. 
 
(5) Home incarcerees shall be under the supervision 
of the county jailer except in counties establishing 
misdemeanor supervision departments, wherein they 
shall be under the supervision of such departments. 
Home incarcerees shall be subject to the decisions of 
such authorities during the period of supervision. 
Fees for supervision or equipment usage shall be 
paid directly to the supervising authority 
 
Sec. 523.220  Conditions of home incarceration 
 
The conditions of home incarceration shall include 
the following: 
 
(1) The home incarceree shall be confined to his 
home at all times except when: 
(a) Working at approved employment or traveling 
directly to and from such employment; 
(b) Seeking employment; 
(c) Undergoing available medical, psychiatric, or 
mental health treatment or approved counseling and 
after care programs; 
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(d) Attending an approved educational institution or 
program; 
(e) Attending a regularly scheduled religious service 
at a place of worship; and 
(f) Participating in an approved community work 
service program; 
 
(2) Violation of subsection (1) of this section may 
subject the home incarceree to prosecution under 
KRS 520.030 (escape); 
 
(3) The home incarceree shall conform to a schedule 
prepared by a designated officer of the supervising 
authority specifically setting forth the times when he 
may be absent from the home and the locations 
where he may be during those times; 
 
(4) The home incarceree shall not commit another 
offense during the period of time for which he is 
subject to the conditions of home incarceration; 
 
(5) The home incarceree shall not change the place of 
home incarceration or the schedule without prior 
approval of the supervising authority; 
 
(6) The home incarceree shall maintain a telephone 
or other approved monitoring device in the home or 
on his person at all times; 
 
(7) Any other reasonable conditions set by the court 
or the supervising authority including: 
(a) Restitution under KRS 533.030; 
(b) Supervision fees under KRS 439.315; and 
(c) Any of the conditions imposed on persons on 
probation or conditional discharge under KRS 
533.030(2); 
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(8)  A written and notarized consent agreement shall 
be filed with the court by every adult who will share 
the offender’s home during the term of home 
incarceration; and 
 
(9) Any supervision fee or other monetary condition, 
except restitution, shall be paid by the defendant 
directly to the person or organization specified by the 
court in a written order, except that any such fees or 
monetary conditions owed to the Department of 
Corrections shall be paid through the circuit clerk. 
 
Sec. 532.230 Ineligibility 
 
No person being held under a detainer, warrant, or 
process issued by some other jurisdiction shall be 
eligible for home incarceration.  No person convicted 
of a violent felony offense shall be eligible for home 
incarceration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
